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Volume XXX March, 1942 Number 3
RES JUDICATA AND CONSPIRACY CASES UNDER
THE SHERTMAN ACT
By FORREST REVERE BIAOK*
In the history of litigation under the Sherman Act, there
are many instances' wherein the government has secured a judg-
ment or decree against the defendants in one jurisdiction and
later instituted another suit involving the same (or closely
related) issues and utilizing the same basic evidence against the
same defendants in another jurisdiction, and yet strange to
'1. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, et al., 152
Fed. 290, 173 Fed. 177, 221 U. S. 1; United States v. Standard Oil Co.
(Indiana), et al. 33 F. (2d) 617, 283 U. S. 163; 2. United States v.
Corn Products Refining Co., et al., 234 Fed. 964; United States v. Corn
Derivatives Institute, et al. (N. D. l., Eq. No. 11634, consent decree
filed April 6, 1932); 3. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn.,
et al., 53 Fed. 440, 58 Fed. 58, 166 U. S. 290; United States v. Missouri
Pacific Railway Co., et al. (E. D. Mo. Eq. No. 5839; Decrees and
Judgments in Antitrust Cases, p. 243; 20 I. C. C. 307); 4. United
States v. Swift & Co., et al., 122 Fed. 529; Swift and Company v.
United States, 196 U. S. 375; Swift & Co., et al. v. United States, 276
U. S. 311; United States v. Swift & Co., et al., 286 U. S. 106; 5. In re
Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 583; United States v. Elliott, et al., 62 Fed. 801,
64 Fed. 27, 29; 6. United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp.,
et al., 34 F. (2d) 984, 282 U. S. 30; United States v. First National
Pictures, Inc., et al., 34 F. (2d) 815, 282 U. S. 44; United States v.
West Coast Theatres, Inc., et al., (S. D. Cal., 1930, Eq. No. S-10-C);
United States v. Fox West Coast Theatres, et al. (S. D. Cal., 1932,
Eq. No. Y-38-H); United States v. Balaban & Katz Corporation, et al.
(N. D. Ill., 1932 Eq. No. 8854); 7. United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co., et al., 222 Fed. 349, 247 U. S. 32 (1918), 227 Fed. 507,
234 Fed. 127, 258 U. S. 451 (1922); 8. Aluminum Co. of America v.
Federal Trade Commission, 284 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 3, 1922); 299 Fed.
361 (C. C. A. 3, 1924). 9. See also United States v. Atlantic Terra
Cotta Company; United States v. American Terra Cotta Co. & Ceramic
Co. and United States v. American Terra Cotta Co. & Ceramic Com-
pany (Nos. 241, 242 and 256 in The Federal Antitrust Laws Blue Book
of the Department of Justice, Gov. Printing Office, January, 1938).
* Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States.
A. B., Wisconsin, 1916; M. A., Columbia, 1919; LL. B., Ohio State,
1920; Ph. D., Brookings Institute, 1925. Formerly Chief Attorney,
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Kentucky.
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relate the defendants have rarely2 made use of the res judicata
doctrine to bar the subsequent litigation. It is only necessary to
trace the juristic formulae that have been evolved to effectuate
the purposes behind the doctrine of re judicata and its accom-
panying corollaries and then to superimpose these against the
common governmental practices in antitrust litigation, and one
will be impressed by the unusual fact disclosed by the record
and will begin to speculate as to the reason why the defendants
have not more frequently raised the res judicata doctrine in
these cases.
We are concerned primarily with the application of the
res judicata doctrine to conspiracy cases under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. However at the outset, it shall be our purpose to
state the traditional doctrines of res judicata generally and then
we shall present an argument to show that the contin zdng nature
of a conspiracy conditions and mnodifies the general doctrine of
res judicata. By way of introduction, certain general distinc-
tions should be noted.
I. RES JUDICATA, STARE DEcISIS, ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT,
MERGER IN JUDGMENT, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND COLLATERAL
ATTACK DISTINGUISHED.
The doctrine of res judicata rests on the two maxims that
"a man should not be twice vexed for the same cause" and that
"it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation." '3
The doctrine of "stare decisis" is not the equivalent of "res
judicata," as it relates, not to the facts, but to the legal princi-
ples involved.4 The "right, question or fact" which when put
in issue and determined to become the subject of the rule of res
judicata must be a question of fact as distinguished from an
abstract of law.5 Res judicata constitutes a plea in bar, founded
on a specific judgment determinative of a specific contest, while
stare decisis is not a plea but a rule of precedent. 6 Res judicata
'The outstanding exception where the res judicata bar was raised
is Aluminum Company of America v. United States, 302 U. S. 230;
see also same case before Expediting Court, 20 Fed. Supp. 608.
'Freeman on Judgments (5th ed.) Vol. 1, p. 1319; Fayerweather
v. Rich, 195 U. S. 276.
'In re Rosier's Will, 140 N. Y. Supp. 844, 846.
State ex rei Kennedy v. Breatch, 94 N. W. 1016, 68 Neb. 687.
'United States v. Certain Bottles (D. C. Conn), 37 F. (2d)
137, 140.
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binds parties and privies generally, while stare decisis governs
the decision of the same question in the same way in an action
between strangers to the record.7
The doctrine of esoppel is not strictly applicable to a judg-
ment. A judgment is not the act of a party, an estoppel is.
A judgment is a bar, not because a party has done some act
which precludes him from asserting a right or title, it is properly
a bar on principles of public policy, because the peace and order
of society, the structure of our judicial system, and the princi-
ples of our government require that a matter once litigated
should not again be drawn in question between the same parties
or their privies.8 Res judicata and estoppel though kindred in
nature are not identical, the former being of higher dignity than
the latter.0 The doctrine of res judicata is based on the doctrine
ef estoppel as applied to court decisions and contemplates only
such points as are actually involved and determined in a case
and not what is said by a judge outside of the record or on points
not necessarily involved therein and also includes (1) identity
of the subject matter, (2) of the cause of action, (3) of the per-
sons and parties to the action, and (4) of the quality in the per-
sons for or against whom the claim is made.10 The four condi-
tions outlined above seem to constitute the orthodox formula and
the statement is made in many cases."
"Jeopardy" or "Double Jeopardy" in its constitutional
and common law sense, has a strict application to criminal prose-
cution only.12 The doctrine of "merger," that a cause of action
when reduced to judgment has ceased to exist as an independent
liability and is transmitted into the obligation created by the
judgment operates only between parties and their privies, and
does not affect strangers.' 3 Res judicata is broad enough to
include "merger in judgment" and "estoppel by judgment"
since both are grounded on fundamental precepts that it is for
'Marguerite Coal Co. v. Meadow River Lumber Co., 127 S. E.
644, 646, 98 W. Va. 698.
'Freeman on Judgments (5th ed.), Vol. 1, p. 1318.
'Coffman v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 81 S. E. 575, 74 W. Va. 57.
'Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. City of Lakeland, 115 So. 669, 679;
94 Fla. 347.
'See Words and Phrases under "Res Judicata".
"Rupert v. State, 113 Pac. 713, 714 (Okla.), 45 L. R. A. (n. s.) 60.
"Frost v. Thompson, 106 N. E. 1009, 1010; 219 Mass. 360.
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the benefit of society that there be an end to litigation and that
no litigant should be vexed twice over the same dispute.' 4
The doctrine of "collateral attack" denies any validity
whatever to the former adjudication, while that of res judicata
admits the entire validity and simply denies the scope claimed
for it. There is little similarity between the two doctrines.
Collateral attack involves the jurisdiction of the court and
denies its power to act at all, while res judicata merely involves
the question concerning what was actually decided in the trial.
The doctrine of collateral attack has nothing to do with the
issues or the matters contested on the trial.'5
II. JUDGEMENT AS BAR DISTINGUISHED FROM ESTOPPEL AS To
PARTICULAR MATTER
Conflicting formulas, laid down in some cases are explained
by the failure to notice that a former adjudication may be used
for two different purposes; namely (1) either as a complete bar
to the reitigation of the same cause of action, or (2) as a con-
clusive evidence of some fact or issue common to different causes
of action.16 It is in the latter sense that the rule has been
established that a decision upon any material point, which has in
fact been litigated and decided, is conclusive, though the subject
matter of the two suits is different.17
The leading authority making this distinction between the
use of a former adjudication as an absolute bar to a second
action and its use as a conclusive adjudication of some issue, fact
or matter material to the determination of a second and
different cause of action or claim is Cromwell v. County of
SaYc . 7 Mr. Justice Field formulated the distinction in the fol-
lowing words:
"In considering the operation of this judgment, it should be
borne in mind, as stated by counsel, that there is a difference be-
tween the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand,
and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same
parties upon a different claim or cause of action. In the former
case, the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an
4 Winters v. Basaillon, 57 P. (2d) 1095, 1097, 153 Ore. 509.
"Van Fleet on Collateral Attack, Sec. 17; Bitzer v. Mercke, 63
S. W. 771, 772, 111 Ky. 299.
"'Freeman on Judgments (5th ed.), secs. 671, 676.
' Russel v. Place, 94 U. S. 606; Davis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 423.174 94 U. S. 351.
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absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim
or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity
with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any
other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose.
"But where the second action between the same parties is upon
a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points
controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or ver-
dict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to
apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action
to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the
inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated
and determined in the original action, not what might have been
thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judg-
ment conclusive in another action." (pp. 352, 353)
A leading case illustrating the estoppel as to a particular
matter is Soidhcrni Pacific R. R. v. U. S.11 The court said:
"A question of fact or of law, distinctly put in issue and
directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a
ground of recovery or defense in a suit or action between parties
sui Juris is conclusively settled by a final judgment or decree
therein so that it cannot be further litigated in a subsequent suit
between the same parties or their privies whether the second suit
be for the same or a different cause of action." ''
On the contrary, the best and most invariable test as to
whether a former judgment is a bar is to inquire whether the
same evidence will sustain both the present and the former
action. "The cause of action is the same when the evidence will
support both actions; or rather the judgment in the former
action will be a bar provided the evidence necessary to sustain
the judgment for the plaintiff in the present action would have
authorized a judgment for him in the former." 1 9 Whatever be
the form of the action, the issue is deemed the same whenever it
may in both actions be supported by substantially the same
same evidence.2°
III. IT IS NOT ONLY THE RIGHT BUT THE DUTY OF THE COURT
FIRST ACQUIRInG JURISDICTION OP THE CAUSE oF ACTION TO
RESTRAIN FURTHER PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED IN ANOTHER
JURISDICTION TO RELITIGATE THE SAME QUESTIONS.
The right and the duty of the court first acquiring jurisdic-
tion of the cause of action to restrain proceedings in another
"168 U. S. 1.
'" See also State of Oklahome v. State of Texas, 256 U. S. 831.
'Kiniry v. Davis, 82 Okla. 211.
2 Freeman on Judgments, sec. 687 (5th ed.).
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court to relitigate the same questions, is well established. It is
predicated on two grounds (1) the duty to protect the jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter entrusted to it and thereby prevent
the possibility of a conflict of authority and (2) the duty of all
courts to prevent parties litigant from being harassed by
relitigation of matters once determined. This right and duty is
inherent in a court of equity and is also authorized by statute.
See. 262 of the Judicial Code authorizes United States courts
"to issue all writs not specifically provide by statute, which may
be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdiction."
In Looney v. Eastern Texas R. R. Co.,21 Mr. Justice Clark,
speaking for the court said:
"The use of the writ of injunction, by federal courts first
acquiring jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter of a
suit, for the purpose of protecting and preserving that jurisdiction
until the object of the suit is accomplished and complete justice
done between the paties, is familiar and long-established practice."
A -comparable ruling was made in Continental illinois
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pac.
R. R. Co.,22 wherein the power of a court of bankruptcy as a
court of equity to protect its jurisdiction by injunction was
sustained. In Steelman, Trustee v. All Continent Corpora-
tion,2 3 Mr. Justice Cardozo said:
"This court has said that the power to issue an injunction when
necessary to prevent the defeat or impairment of its jurisdiction is
. . . inherent in a court of bankruptcy, as it is in a duly established
court of equity. (289). The trustee is not seeking a writ of
prohibition directed to the court itself. He is not seeking an in-junction to vindicate his exclusive control over a res in his possession,
actual or constructive, of the court that appointed him .... What
he seeks is an injunction directed to a suitor, and not to any court,
upon the ground that the suitor is misusing a jurisdiction which
by hypothesis exists, and converting it by such misuse into an
instrument of wrong.... We are unable to yield assent to the
statement of the court below that the restraint of a proper party is
legally tantamount to the restraint of the court 'itself'. The reality
of the distinction has illustration in a host of cases." (290-291).
In Georgia Power Co. v. T.V.A., 24 the court said:
"The jurisdiction of courts of equity to interfere and effectuate
their own decrees by injunctions or writs of assistance, in order to
avoid relitigation of questions once settled between the same parties
is well settled, Root v. Woolworth, 150 U.S. 401, 411, 412."
=247 U. S. 214, 221 (1918).
294 U. S. 648, 675, 676.
301 U. S. 278 (1937).
17 Fed. Supp. 769 (N. D. Ga. 1937).
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This ruling was affirmed in 89 F. (2d) 218 (5th Cir. 1937),
where the court said:
"Rarely has a conflict arisen between two federal courts in a
civil case. With regard to conflicts between state and federal
courts, which occur frequently, the rule is so well settled as to be
considered elementary. There is no logical reason why it should
differ as to Federal Courts. (221)."
The general governing principle is stated in 14 R.C.L. 470,
as follows:
"The theory on which a court of equity acts in enjoining
a proceeding in another court of coordinate jurisdiction is that
it has jurisdiction in persnam, and that so acting, it has power to
require the defendant to do, or to refrain from doing, anything beyond
the limits of its territorial jurisdiction, which it might require to be
done or omitted within the limits of such territory. In such a case
it may restrain a party from prosecuting a subsequent suit in anotherjurisdiction, whether the objects of the two suits are the same or not,
if the effect of the second suit is to withdraw from the court first
acquiring jurisdiction a part of the subject matter of the first suit.
When an injunction is granted for this purpose, it is in no sense a
prohibition to those courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction. It
is not addressed to them and does not even assume to interfere with
them. The process is directed only to the parties. It neither assumes
any superiority over the court in which the proceedings are had, nor
denies its jurisdiction."
The first court in the Kessler case,25 discussed later, never
had before it the defendant in the second suit and yet it issued
an injunction. In the Looney and the T.V.A. case, supra, the
first court had done no more than pass upon a preliminary
injunction application, granting it in the Looney ease and
denying it in the T.V.A. case and yet injunctions were issued
against prosecutions of the second suits.
IV. A COURT HAS THE RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS OWN PROCESS
FRaO ABUSE.
A leading text book writer on251 the Sherman Act cites the
case of In re National Window Glass Workers25b as the only
authority for the following proposition: "A conviction or an
acquittal on an indictment for a continuing conspiracy bars
another prosecution based on the same alleged conspiracy dur-
ing a period subsequent to the return of the indictment on which
the conviction or acquittal was had." Further, Point 9 in the
syllabus of the case states the rule as follows: "A conviction or
" 206 U. S. 285
14 Thornton, Combinations in Restraint of Trade, see. 410a.2b287 Fed. 219 (1922).
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an acquittal on an indictment for continuing conspiracy bars
another prosecution based on the same conspiracy, but different
overt acts, during the period subsequent to the return of the
indictment on which the conviction or acquittal was had." It is
submitted that both the Thornton interpretation and the syl-
labus from the case are incorrect statements of what the case
really held.
In this case the parties named in the caption filed in the
United States District Court for the northern district of Ohio,
eastern division on October 9, 1922 an application to quash,
vacate and set aside certain subpoenas and subpoenas duces
tecum duly served requiring them to appear and to give testi-
mony and produce documents in a grand jury investigation
about to be undertaken in this court. It appears that on
March 17, 1922, a grand jury attending the United States
District Court for the southern district of New York returned
an indictment against these same defendants. A demurrer to
the New York indictment was overruled in June 1922 and then
a motion for a bill of particulars was granted on August 1, 1922.
This bill was not served until September 16, 1922. The case was
put on the calendar September 11, 1922, but a date for trial had
not been fixed at the time when the motion to quash the sub-
poenas had been made in the Ohio District Court. The court
held that where an indictment was already pending in another
jurisdiction, subpoenas for witnesses to attend and produce
documents at a grand jury investigation of the same charge,
which was mainly for the purpose of enabling the government
to procure testimony to be used in the trial of the other indict-
ment, though it intended to ask for an indictment by that grand
jury, on which, however, defendants would be tried only in the
event the other indictment was dismissed for want of prosecu-
tion, was an abitse of process, so that such subpoenas will be
vacated and set aside and the grand jury investigation
restrained, until the government either has tried the defendants
in the other district or stipulates for trial first on any indict-
ment obtained from this grand jury. The court has a super-
visory duty of seeing that its grand jury and its process are not
abused or used for purposes of oppression and injustice.
District Judge Westehhaver said, "May the government proceed
from district to district in which overt acts have been com-
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mitted in the furtherance of a continuing criminal conspiracy,
and continuously and successively investigate the same trans-
actions and indict the same persons? -May counsel, parties and
witnesses be called from their duty and obligation to prepare for
trial on an indictment already returned, at the will and discre-
tion of the government counsel? Is there any power or dis-
cretion in a District Court to prevent or set a limit to the oppres-
sion or injustice which may thus be inflicted? If any necessity
or substantial reason for a new investigation is shown, the
vourt undoubtedly would decline to interfere with a new
investigation and the return of a new indictment. The only
claimed justification for the present investigation is to get a
new indictment, not for the purpose of immediate trial, but
only for use in the event the New York prosecution should fail
for want of jurisdiction. This claim seems to be without much
substance. See In re Palliser 136 U. S. 257. Benson v. Henkel
198 U. S. 1, 15." (pp. 226-227)."
v. THE GENERAL RULE .S TO PERSONS BOUND BY A JUDGMENT
AND THE EXCEPTIONS THERETO.
Freeman on Judgments26 states the general rule as to per-
sons bound by a judgment, in these words: "An adjudication
takes effect only between those who are parties or privies io the
judgment, and that it gives no rights to or against third
parties."27 But this general rule is subject to well recognized
exceptions. Some of the more important of which are: (1) the
"doctrine of representation" in which for convenience or
practical necessity a judgment against a party may be con-
clusive on others, not actual parties, whom he is deemed to
sufficiently represent because of the similarity of their
interests.281 "Class representation" is an illustration of this
exception ;20 (2) another exception is where persons, though not
nominal parties are the real parties in interest; 30 (3) where
persons, not nominal parties actually participate in the litiga-
tion by actively and openly directing and controlling the same
through persons who are parties;31 (4) or where the relation to
(5th ed.), Vol. 1, sec. 407.
'Kapelani's Estate v. Atcherly, 238 U. S. 119.
"Freeman, secs. 409, 453, 437.
Ibid, sec. 436.
Ibid, sec. 430.
* Ibid, see. 432.
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one of the parties is such that if he is given notice and an
opportunity to defend he is bound by the result as against the
party in whose behalf he was required to defend.32
One of the leading cases which illustrates the principle that
injunctions to prevent relitigation are not limited strictly by the
doctrine of res judicata is Kessler v. Eldred.3 3 Here Kessler,
defendant in a patent infringement suit, had obtained a dis-
missal of the action. Subsequently the plaintiff, Eldred, sued
certain of Kessler's customers, whereupon Kessler sought, but
was refused in the lower court, an injunction against further
prosecution of such suits. This ruling was reversed on appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States. The court held that
Kessler was entitled to an injunction, stating:
"If rights between litigants are once established by the finaljudgment of a court of competent jurisdiction those rights must be
recognized in every way, and wherever the judgment is entitled to
respect, by those who are bound by it." (289).
The court went on to say that it was unnecessary to deter-
mine whether the principle of res judicata was applicable inas-
much as the injunction was justified on the broader ground that
the subject matter of both suits had been litigated in the first
and that Kessler was by implication of the first judgment, fairly
entitled to have his customers free from suit. The exclusion of
the issue of res judicata was in these words (288) :
"Whether the judgment between Kessler and Eldred is a bar
to the suit of Eldred v. Breitwiesser . . .we deem it unnecessary
to inquire .... It may be that the judgment in Kessler v. Eldred
will not afford Breitwiesser, a customer of Kessler a defense to
Eldred's suit against him. Upon that question we express no
opinion."
The Kessler case thus shows that an injunction to protect
the jurisdiction of the court is broader than the strict doctrine
of res judicata would permit.
VI. JOINDER OF ADDITIONAL PARTIES IN THE SECOND SUIT
(WHICH IS IDENTICAL WITH THE FIRST) CANNOT HAVE
TnE LEGAL EFFECT OF JUSTIFYING A PROCEEDING DE Novo
AND IGNORING THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT OR DECREE.
In Thompson v. Roberts,3 4 the court said:
"The objection that the parties were not the same in both suits
cannot be sustained. ... No good reason can be given why the
Ibid., sees. 447-450.206 U. S. 285 (1907).
"24 Howard 233, 241.
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parties in this case, who litigated the same question, should not be
concluded by the decree, because others having an interest in the
question or subject matter were admitted by the practice of a court
of chancery to assist on both sides."
The Thompson case was a suit at law on a promissory note
and then a suit in equity to foreclose the mortgage accompany-
ing the note. Fraud was the defense in both suits. The court
said:
"The question between the present parties is res judicata and
none the less binding because others are concluded also. A contrary
doctrine would sacrifice a wholesome principle of law to a mere
technical rule having no foundation in reason; making a distinction
where there is no difference."
Freeman on Judgments 5 points out that it makes no dif-
ference whether the added parties are in the first or second suit;
and further that jurisdiction will not be taken in equity to retry
on the same facts a cause of action that has been decided in pro-
ceedings at law.36
VII. THE FACT THAT ADDITIONAL RELIEF IS SOUGHT IN THE
SECOND SUIT IN ANOTHER JURIsDICTION CANNOT AvoID THE
BINDING EFFECT OF THE FIRST DECREE.
Freeman on Judgments 37 states the doctrine as follows:
"If the claim or cause of action is substantially the same in both
actions it is not material that the relief demanded is in some measure
different. Thus the fact that only part of the relief sought in the
first action is demanded in the second is immaterial.... And a
cause of action is not varied by claiming additional damages."
In Green v. Bogue,38 the court said:
"We do not deem the fact that a different form or measure of
relief is now asked deprives the defendants in error of the pro-
tection of the prior findings and decrees in their favor."
In Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Gaston, Williams & Wig-
more,39 the court said:
"The mere fact that the complainant changes his prayer for
relief does not affect the decree in the former suit as a bar to this
suit. See Green v. Bogue, 158 U.S. 478; in re Samuels (C.CA.) 263
Fed. 561; Coleman v. Apple (C.C.A.) 298 Fed. 718."
(5th ed.), vol. 1, sec. 417.
Ibid., vol. 2, see. 644.
'Vol. 2, sec. 683.
158 U. S. 478.
13 F. (2d) 267, 268 (S. D. N. Y. 1926).
L. J.-2
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VIII. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA RELATING TO THE
CAUSE AND FORM OF ACTION
The doctrine of res judicata includes so many corollaries
and implications, and these in turn are subject to so many
exceptions, that for our purposes under this sub-heading we
shall merely group in vacuo certain general principles in sum-
mary form.
DIPFERENCES IN FORM OF ACTION CANNOT DEFEAT DOCTRINE OF
RES JUDICATA
Freeman on Judgments, states the rule :40
"It is not material that the form of action be the same, if the
merits were tried in the first case. A party cannot by varying the
form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of
action shall not be twice litigated. Where either of two remedies
is equally available to vindicate the same right, the judgment in an
action employing one of them will bar a resort to the other."
CAUSE OF ACTION INCLUDED ALL GROUNDS OF ACTION
Freeman on Judgments, states the rule as follows :41
'"Where the parties and the gist of the action are the same,
differences in the grounds of the action which do not change the
substantial cause of action do not prevent the second judgment
from operating as a bar. There is an obvious distinction between
grounds of action and cause of action; a single cause of action may
be based upon several grounds, in which event, whether actually
litigated or not, they are all merged in the judgment which bars a
new action on the same cause of action on a different ground. ...
But the general rule respecting grounds of action has no application
to separate and independent causes of action which might but need
not be joined in one action." (Union Central Life Insurance Co.
v. Drake, 214 Fed. 536.)
TnE DOCTRINE OF SPLITTING CAUSES
Van Fleet on "Former Adjudication," states the rule:42
"The maxim that declares that no persons shall be twice vexed
for one and the same cause prohibits a person from splitting a single
cause into several and suing his adversary piecemeal. If he does
so, the first adjudication will bar all the other suits."
WHAT Issum WAS LITIGATED?
Van Fleet on "Former Adjudication," states the rule :48
"Vol. 2, secs. 648, 583, 611, 734, 737.
"Vol. 2, sec. 681.2 Vol. 1, sec. 59.
'Vol. 2, sec. 413.
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"If the record shows the precise issue litigated there is no
occasion to use parol or extrinsic evidence to prove what it was,
and it cannot be done. But if the record, on account of its generality,
fails to show what issue was on controversy, that fact may be
proven by parol."
In Russell v. Place,4 4 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that,
"If it appears from the record that several distinct matters
may have been litigated, upon one or more of which that judgment
may have passed, without indicating which of them was thus litigated,
and upon which the judgment was rendered, the whole subject
matter of the action will be at large, and open to a new contention,
unless this uncertainty be removed by extrinsic evidence showing
the precise point involved and determined."
The plea of res judicata is stricti juris and must be estab-
lished beyond question, and all doubts inure to the benefit of the
of the party against whom it is pleaded. 45
NEV FACTS: IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION DOES NOT
DEPEND UPON IDENTITY OF FACTS
In Baltimore ,teamship Co. v. Phillips,4 6 Mr. Justice
Sutherland, spealdig for the court, said:
"A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful
violation of a right which the facts show. The number and variety
of the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action
so long as their result, whether they be considered severally or in
combination, is the violation of but one right by a single legal wrong.
The mere multiplication of grounds of negligence alleged as causing
the same injury does not result in multiplying the causes of action.
The facts are merely the means and not the end. They do not con-
stitute the cause of action, but they show its existence by making
the wrong appear. 'The thing, therefore which in contemplation of
law as its cause, becomes a ground for action, is not the group of
facts alleged in the declaration, bill or indictment, but the result of
these in a legal wrong, the existence of which, if true, they con-
clusively evince. Chobanian v. Washburn Wire Co., 33 R.I. 289,
302." [Italics by Supreme Court.]
PART II
IX. THE CONTINUING NATURE OF A CONSPIRACY CONDITIONS
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
The continuing nature of a conspiracy conditions the
general doctrine of res judicata. This point will be developed
from two points of view; (1) in the case of a regulatory injunc-
' 94 U. S. 606, 608.
1 Van Fleet on Former Adjudication, sec. 278.
'274 U. S. 316, 321 (1927).
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tion, applied to future changing business practices, the decree
may be modified but the remedy must be sought generally in the
form of supplemental relief in the first jurisdiction and not by
a relitigation of the same issues in another court. (2) the later
overt acts of a continuing conspiracy may so modify, contract or
enlarge the pre-existing conspiracy that a new cause of action
will arise and if this can be shown, a detour around the
traditional doctrines of res judicata may be established. In de-
veloping this concept, the following types of cases will be con-
sidered; (A) The application of the Statute of Limitations
under the Sherman Act (which does not require the averment
or proof of an overt act as a condition of liability); (B) The
application of the Statute of Limitations under Revised Statute
sec. 5440 dealing with conspiracy "to commit any offense against
the United States," which statute does require the averment
and proof of an overt act; (C) The application of the "Immu-
nity Statute" to a continuing conspiracy, and (D) The so-called
"retroactive" application of the statute which penalizes a con-
spiracy, the formation of which antedates the statute. These
cases demonstrate that the concept of a continuing offense has
modified and conditioned many of the traditional doctrines
associated with the interpretation of statutes of limitations,
immunity statutes and the retroactive application of criminal
statutes. There is no sound reason why the continuing offense
concept should not also modify and condition the traditional
doctrine of res judicata.
X. WHERE BECAUSE OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES (NEW
FACTS) IT IS ALIEGED THAT A DECREE SHOULD BE MODI-
FIED, THE REMEDY MUST BE SOUGHT IN THE FORm OF
SUPPLEMENTAL RELIEF IN THE FIRST JURISDICTION AND NOT
BY A RELITIGATION OF THE SAME ISSUES IN ANOTHER COURT
A fortiori must this be true of a cause of action under the
Sherman Act culminating in a regulatory decree of an ever
changing business, a decree characterized in United States v.
Swift & Co.,47 by Mr. Justice Cardozo as "A continuing decree
of injunction directed to events to come. . . . The distinction is
between restraints that give protection to rights fully accrued
upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially impervious
- 286 U. S. 106, 114 (1932).
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to change and those that involve the supervision of changing
conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative."
If the first decree is not confined to then existing conditions, but
was designedly drawn as a comprehensive and permanent
regulation of the future then the proper manner to modify that
first decree is to seek supplemental relief in the first jurisdiction.
In the Swift case, supra, (at 114, 115) Mr. Justice Cardozo said:
"We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to
modify an injunction in adaptation to changed conditions though it
was entered by consent. The power is conceded by the government.
S.. The result is all one whether the decree has been entered after
litigation or by consent .... In either event, a court does not
abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate if satisfied that
what it has been doing has been turned through changing circum-
stances into an instrument of wrong."
In United States v. American Can Co.,48 the court pointed
out that if an injunction should prove ineffective, the Govern-
ment could always reopen the proceeding and move for a dis-
solution saying:
"It is of course possible that these forecasts of the future may
not be realized. In that event the retention of jurisdiction will
enable the government promptly and cheaply to compel a dissolu-
tion whenever anything which defendant may hereafter do, or
whenever anything which may hereafter happen makes such action
necessary or expedient."
Illustrations of proceedings by supplemental petition in the
court where jurisdiction was originally invoked are United
States v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J.,49 where in 1911 the Stand-
ard Oil Co. of N. J. and Vacuum Oil Co. were dissolved by decree
in 1911 and when the two companies sought to merge nineteen
years later, the government proceeded by supplemental petition
in the court having original jurisdiction to enjoin the merger as
a violation of the decree of 1911. Again when the government
became dissatisfied with the efficacy of an antitrust decree
obtained against the International Harvester Co. in 1918 as the
result of a petition filed in 1912, it did not start a new proceed-
ing, but in 1923, filed a supplemental petition in the old action
praying that the original decree be reopened and amended to
the end that the International Harvester Co. might be dis-
solved.50 So when the large meat packers became dissatisfied
"234 Fed. 1019 (D. Md. 1916).
47 F. (2d) 288 (1931).
"United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693.
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with the antitrust decree entered against them in 1920, they
proceeded ten years later by a petition in the original action to
seek a modification of that decree.5 1
XL THE CONTINUING NATURE OF A CONSPIRACY HAS CON-
DITIONED THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
UNDER TM SHERrAN ACT (which does not require the
averment or proof of an overt act as a condition of liability)
Despite the fact, as stated by Judge Carpenter, 52 that "the
Sherman Act is primarily a criminal statute," it was more than
twenty years after the passage thereof before a case started by
indictment reached the United States Supreme Court for
review.53 Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in the Kissel case
that "A conspiracy in restraint of trade is different from and
more than a contract in restraint of trade. A conspiracy is con-
stituted by an agreement, it is true, but it is the result of the
agreement, rather than the agreement itself, just as a partner-
ship, although constituted by a contract, is not the contract but
is the result of it. The contract is instantaneous, the partner-
ship may endure as one and the same partnership for years.
A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes. That as
such it may have continuation in time is shown by the rule that
an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any
new agreement specifically directed to that act."
The Kissel case is one of the best reasoned decisions that
analyzes the nature of a conspiracy. Mr. Justice Holmes said,
"the defendants argue that a conspiracy is a completed crime
as soon as formed, and that it is simply a case of unlawful agree-
ment, and that therefore the cantinuando may be disregarded
and a plea is proper to show that the statute of limitations 7tas
run. Subsequent acts in pursuance of the agreement may renew
the conspiracy or be evidence of a renewal, but do not change the
nature of the original offense. So also it is said, the fact that an
unlawful contract contemplates future acts or that the results
of a successful conspiracy endure to a much later date does not
affect the character of the crime." (p. 607)
To which argument, Mr. Justice Holmes replies: "The
'United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106.
United States v. Swift, 188 Fed. 92.
'
TUnited States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601.
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argument, so far as the premises are true, does not suffice to
prove that a conspiracy, although it exists as soon as the agree-
ment is made, may not continue beyond the moment of making
it. It is true that the unlawful agreement satisfies the definition
of the crime, but it does not exhaust it. It is also true of course,
that the mere continuance of the result of a crime does not con-
tinue the crime. (United States v. Irvine, 98 U. S. 450). But
when the plot contemplates bringing to pass a continuous result
that will not continue without the continuous cooperation of the
conspirators to keep it up, and there is such continuous coopera-
tion, it is a perversion of natural thought and of natural
language to call such continuous cooperation a cinematographic
series of distinct conspiracies, rather than to call it a single one
. . . If they do continue such efforts in pursuance of the plan
the conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or
success." (p. 608)
One of the counts in the indictment to which the three year
statute of limitations had been pleaded, alleged that on a
certain date (six years prior to the indictment) "and from that
date until the day of presenting the indictment" the defendants
have been engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade.
Mr. Justice Holmes emphasized the narrow limits of the court's
decision by concluding: "All that we decide is that a conspiracy
may have continuance in time, and that where, as here, the
indictment, consistently with the other facts, alleges that it did
so continue to the date of filing, that allegation must be denied
under the general issue and not by a special plea."
The case of Boyle v. United States,54 illustrates the rule as
to the application of the statute of limitations to a "continuing
conspiracy." This was a suit based on a conspiracy count under
sec. 1 of the Sherman Act. The court said, "Nor was the
government barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs
in error were not tried for entering into a written conspiracy
of April 1st, 1911, but were convicted of the unlawful con-
spiracy to restrain trade which was a continuing conspiracy or
combination, while the parties entering into such unlawful com-
bination might have withdrawn from such combination and
thereby relieved themselves from further liability and the
"259 Fed. 801.
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statute of limitations would have begun to run from the time of
such withdrawal, yet it required some affirmative act on the part
of the conspirators to avoid the liability which their entry into
the combination created."
The conspiracy rule under the Sherman Act as to the time
of commission of the offense, that there is no need to aver and
prove overt acts and the continuing nature of the offense is well
stated in the case of United States v. CoweZl. 55 District Judge
Wolverton said, "In a case under this statute, it is unnecessary
to set out any overt act. . . . But the combination is not a thing
of the instant the minds of the agreeing parties have come to a
complete understanding, either expressed or implied. The pur-
pose thereof is an essential element as well, and this may contem-
plate that its operation shall extend over a period of time.
While the parties are engaged in the operation of the design, or
in carrying the same into effect, they are transgressing the
statute, they are still agreeing to the unlawful offense, and still
cohering in the thing that the law condemns. Thus the offense
becomes a continuing one, and it is only necessary to allege that
the parties were engaged in the unlawful combination or
contract between specified dates. By such allegation, the
offenders are apprised of the time of their transgression.
(United States v. Mae Andrews & Forbes (0.C.) 149 Fed.
823.)"
XII. THE CONTINUING NATURE OF A CONSPIRACY HAS CON-
DITIONED TB E APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF LImTATIoNs
UNDER REVISED STATUTE SEC. 5440 DEALING WITH CON-
SPIRACy "To CoImIT ANY OFFENSE AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES" (which statute does require the averment and proof
of an overt act)
In Bannon v. United States,5 6 it was held that at common
law it was neither necessary to aver or prove an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy. In United States v. Brittin,57
the court interpreted the basic United States statute (See. 5440
R. S.) dealing with conspiracy "to commit any offense against
the United States." (It should be noted that there are no com-
243 Fed. 730.
156 U. S. 464.
' 108 U. S. 199.
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mon law offenses against the United States.5s "In the Bannon
and Britton cases the court said "that Sec. 5440 R. S. changes
the common law only in requiring an overt act to be alleged
and proved, thus affording a locus poenitentiae, so that before
the act done either one or all of the parties may abandon their
design and thus avoid the penalty prescribed by the statute." 59
In United States v. Nash,60 which involved two conspiracy
counts under the Sherman Act, the court said "The Sherman
Act punishes the conspiracies at which it is aimed on the common
law footing-that is to say, it does not make the doing of any
act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability. The
decisions as to the relations of a subsequent overt act to crimes
under Rev. Stat. sec. 5440 in Hyde v. United States,60 ' and
Brown v. Elliot,ob have no bearing on a statute that does not
contain the requirements found in that section."
However two cases dealing with the application of the
statute of limitations to actions brought under Revised Statutes
sec. 5440, which are in the nature of continuing conspiracies,
should be noted. In United States v. Bradford,61 the court
said, "It is plain then, that the statute of limitations is not set
in motion by the forming of the conspiracy, but that the moment
the conspiracy is formed, and an overt act is commited by one
of the conspirators to effect the purpose of the conspiracy, that
moment the offense can be prosecuted, and the statute of
limitations begins to run as regards that conspiracy and that
particular overt act. But I am absolutely unable to agree that
if, after committing the first overt act, the conspirators do
nothing more for three years, and they are not prosecuted
within that time, they can thereafter continue the conspiracy, or
renew it either secretly or publicly and as often as they please,
and that they can commit as many acts as they choose to effect
the object of the conspiracy. It is well settled as I have already
said, that the overt act need not itself be an offense. It might
therefore be absolutely non-criminal per se, and being such, it
could not attract the attention or arouse the suspicion of the
government. That immunity from prosecution for the con-
"U. S. Hudson, 7 Cr. 32.
'See also United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 193, 205.229 U. S. 373, 378.
604 225 U. S. 347.
e01 225 U. S. 392.
148 Fed. 413 (C. C. E. D. La. 1905).
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spiracy would result from the lapse of three years after the
commission of the first overt act, although the conspiracy was
thereafter continued or repeatedly renewed, and many other
overt acts committed under it, is, to my mind, an utterly
irrational conclusion which the law could never have contem-
plated. . . It is inconceivable to me that the statute of
limitations should begin to run before the government could
prosecute." (417418)
In United States v. Greene,62 the court held that a con-
spiracy to defraud the United States is punishable under Rev.
Stats. 5440, notwithstanding the fact that the scheme to defraud
was originally devised and entered into at a time so remote that
prosecution for acts then done would be barred by limitation,
when it was continuous in its operation, and overt acts have
been committed thereunder within the period of limitation; and
an indictment which after reciting the original scheme, charges
a conspiracy at a later date to apply it, in pursuance of which
overt acts were committed, is not objectionable on the ground of
duplicity. The court said, a conspiracy "is not the case of an
attempt to commit crime. The object of requiring proof of some
act in furtherance of the unlawful agreement is to show that the
unlawful combination became a living, active combination.
(p. 352) . . ." The court cites the case of People v. Mather,621
with approval of the following conspriacy doctrine: "The law
considers, that wherever they act, there they renew, or perhaps
to speak more properly, they continue their agreement, and this
agreement is renewed or continued as to all whenever one of
them does an act in furtherance of their common design."
XIII. THE CONTINUING NATURE OF A CONSPIRACY HAS CON-
DITIONED THE APPLICATION OF THE IMMUNITY STATUTE
One of the best reasoned eases on this point is United States
v. Swift6 3 This was a criminal prosecution by the United
States under the Sherman Act. In 1904, the defendants, acting
under the protection of the Immunity Statute of February 11,
1893, testified before the Commissioner of Corporations. The
court phrased the question before it in the following words:
2115 Fed. 343 (1902).
14 Wend. 229.
"186 Fed. 1002 (1911).
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"Assuming that the defendants informed the Commissioner in
1904 that they were conspiring or combining together in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, was the immunity granted them by
the statute, and by the judgment of this court, so perfect that
they may continue indefinitely in their unlawful undertaking?
• . .What I must decide is whether, granting that defendants
were entitled to immunity from prosecution for any crime
committed at the time they testified before the Commissioner,
are they now immune, and will they forever be immune from
prosecution for any acts concerning, or discovered by reason of,
the matters, transactions and things about which they then
testified?" (p. 1008, 1012) The court held that such immunity
did not extend to a subsequent prosecution for continuing the
same conspiracy thereafter, nor did it obliterate the facts
testified to, which if legally competent and relevant, might be
shown in the subsequent prosecution. The court said, "I cannot
agree that the immunity act purposely was made attractive as a
kind of bonus or bribe to induce innocent disclosures by the
promise that a future crime concerning the acts, transactions
and things testified about would pass unpunished ... The
defendant's position is that a general statement of one's business
made to the Commissioner of Corporations will prevent the
government from using such information in any way for the
purpose of ferreting out or prosecuting future crimes connected
with that business. .. ." (p. 1016). It was further urged by
the defendant that the legal effect of the immunity statute was
the same as an amnesty or pardon, and that "the legal effect of
the pardon or amnesty (the same thing) is to wholly obliterate
the offense, and all of its consquences; to furnish a legal
equivalent for conclusive proof that the pardoned acts never
existed." To this contention the court said, "Amnesty or par-
don obliterates the offense, it is true, at least to such extent that
for all legal purposes the one-time offender is to be relieved in the
future from all its results; but it does not obliterate the acts
themselves. It puts the offender in the same position as though
what he had done never had been unlawful; but it does not close
the judicial eye to the fact that once he had done the acts which
constituted the offense." (pp. 1016-1017)
The case contains one of the best discussions of the legal
implications of a continuing conspiracy. "The books say some-
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times that each overt act 'renews' the conspiracy. This can be
true only in the sense that the overt act constitutes renewed or
further evidence of the continued existence of the conspiracy.
A conspiracy is always required to support the overt act."
(p. 1014) "The fact that conspiracies generally may be, and
usually are, continuing agreements or understandings, em-
phatically is true of conspiracies to restrain or to monopolize
commerce. . . . Restraint or monopolization of commerce for
a moment or a day is not the object of a conspiracy to restrain
or monopolize it. The conspirators seek continuous restraint
and monopolization." (p. 1015) "The argument of the
defendants is that the crime of conspiracy is non-continuing,
because the essential element of the offense is the act of con-
federating or plotting, which is in itself inherently a non-con-
tinuing act. The authorities are to the contrary." (p. 1015)
"Suppose that in 1904 the defendants admitted to the Commis-
sioner of Corporations that they had conspired to restrain the
fresh meat trade in the country. Suppose that the confession
was used to search out other evidence tending to show that the
conspiracy organized in 1904 had been in continuous operation
up to and including the month of September 1910. Can they
stand boldly upon the proposition that with respect to these
matters, transactions and things which they had confessed they
are immune for all time to come? Not only immune from
punishment concerning the things of the past which they dis-
closed, but immune from punishment for continuing in their
unlawful engagement? Not only that, but immune from the use
of the evidence against them for any purpose at any time there-
after? Immunity does not mean license. If it does, then one
need only to confess his crime, and his license to violate the law
becomes perpetual." (p. 1016)
XIV. TnE CONTINUING NATURE OF A CONSPIRACY HAS CON-
DITIONED THE SO-CALLED "RETRoACTIVE" APPLICATION Or
THE STATUTE WHICH PENALIZES A CONSPIRACY, THE FORmA-
TION OF WHICH ANTEDATES THE STATUTE
The original agreement or conspiracy often antedates the
passing of the statute, the purpose of which is to outlaw it. In
such a situation, the defendant attempts to establish the proposi-
tion that the statute is being given a retroactive application.
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Two leading cases, wherein this contention has been overruled
are Trans-Missouri Traffic Assn. v. United States,64 and Waters-
Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas.65 In the Trans-Missouri case, an action
under the Sherman Act, the defendants contended "that to
grant the injunction prayed for in this case is to give the statute
a retroactive effect. That the contract at the time it was entered
into is not prohibited or declared illegal by the statute, as it
had not then been passed; and to now enjoin the doing of an
act which was legal at the time it was done would be improper."
The court said, "We give to the law no retroactive effect. The
agreement in question is a continuing one. . . . Assuming such
action to have been legal at the time the agreement was first
entered into, the continuation of the agreement, after it had been
declared to be illegal, becomes a violation of the Act. The
statute prohibits the continuing or entering into such an agree-
ment for the future, and if the agreement be continued it then
becomes a violation of the Act."
In the Waters-Pierce case, a proceeding under the Texas
Antitrust law, the court said to the argument that the statute
was being given a retroactive effect, "This argument is pre-
dicated largely upon the contention that the conviction in this
case was because of the old agreement. . . . made long before
the passage of the present statute at a time when it was legal.
. . . There was ground for conviction not because of the mak-
ing of the old agreement . . . but because the new company
was found to have carried out the old agreement after the
passage of the law had brought itself within its terms."
(107-108)
XV. RECAPITULATIoN-THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS TO BE DRAwN
FROM THE CONCEPT OF CONSPIRACY AS A CONTINUING
OFFENSE AND THEm EFFECT ON THE TRADrIONAL DOCTRINE
OF RES JUDICATA.
The authorities cited dealing with (a) the statute of limita-
tions; (b) the immunity statute and (c) with the contention
that a retroactive application of the conspiracy statute had been
made, are introduced as indirect evidence to clarify the legal
implications to be drawn from the concept of conspiracy as a
" 166 U. S. 290.
15 212 U. S. 86.
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continuing offense. These cases demonstrate that the concept
of a continuing offense has modified and conditioned many of
the traditional doctrines associated with the interpretations of
statutes of limitations, immunity statutes and the retroactive
application of criminal statutes. There is no sound reason why
the continuing offense concept should not also modify and condi-
tion the traditional doctrine of res judicata.
Inherent in the continuing offense concept is the idea that
the government in a suit seeking to prevent the further con-
tinuance of a conspiracy in restraint of trade and in the
monopolization thereof must have the right to state the whole
conspiracy, although what it is directly seeking is to enjoin or
penalize its present stage. There may be an almost infinite
variety of steps taken which constitute the conspiracy and later
developments may alter the legal picture which was passed upon
in an earlier decision between the same parties. It is imperative
that the government should not be hamstrung in presenting the
effect of the prior stages to assist the court in drawing its con-
clusions as to the legality of the latest steps and their relation
to the whole conspiracy which is a continuing thing.
XVI. PossmLE DETOURS AROUND THE REs JUDICATA DOCTRINE.
(A) A "New" Conspiracy
It is our thesis that the later overt acts of a continuing con-
spiracy may so modify, contract or enlarge the pre-existing con-
spiracy, that in contemplation of law a new conspiracy is born,
and if this can be shown, a detour around the traditional doc-
trines of res judicata may be established. The idea of con-
spiracy as a continuing offense, under which each subsequent
overt act not only renews but also may modify in fact the basic
conspiracy, presents squarely the query whether in law a con-
tinuing offense necessarily and inherently implies that it is
limited to a mere prolongation of the "same offense," which is
a basic concept in the doctrine of res judicata.
A basic minimum on which all courts are in agreement is
that prosecutions are for the same offense when they are for
violations of the same provision of the criminal law and when
the facts on which they are based are the same.e6 Various tests
See Commentaries on The Administration of the Criminal Law,
American Law Institute, Official Draft 1935, p. 9.
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for the determination of whether two acts constitute the "same
offense" have been established. In 1796 the English courts
stated a test for determining when two offenses are not the
same offense. This was known as the test in Vandercomb's
caseG7 and was stated as follows:
'Unless the first indictment was such as the prisoner might have
been convicted upon by a proof of the facts contained in the second
indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment can be no bar to the
second."
Later courts in order to determine the "same offense" used the
converse of the rule in the Vandercomb case and stated it to be
that "if the facts sufficient to support the second indictment
would have warranted a conviction on the first indictment, the
two offenses are the same."
In stating the converse of the rule, some courts appear to
have confused "would have warranted a conviction on the first
indictment " " with "would have warranted a conviction of the
offense charged in the first indictment." The latter phraseology
has been attacked on the ground that it fails to encompass the
uniformity of certain conclusions that a charge of murder is a
bar to a prosecution for assault and battery, since under the
latter language if a defendant is first charged with murder and
acquitted, a latter prosecution for assault and battery is not
barred since the facts necessary to prove assault and battery
would not secure a conviction for murder. 9
But some courts state that "This general rule (i.e. the
negative rule of the Vandercomb case) is, however, subject to
this exception: When after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes, for which the defendant is responsible, which
changes the character of the offense, and together with the facts
existing at the time constitutes a new and distinct crime, an
acquittal or conviction of the first offense is not a bar to an
indictment for the second.70
Another formulation of the contention here advanced is
stated as follows: "An adjudication is conclusive only as to
those matters capable of being controverted between the parties
at the time, and as to conditions then existing, and cannot
M2 Leach C. C. 708, 720.
"People v. Nelson, 71 Cal. App. 476, 479 (1924).
"See Commentaries on the Administration of the Criminal Law,
Official Draft 1935, at p. 27.
o State v. Littlefield, 70 Mo. 452, 456 (1880).
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operate as an estoppel to another action or proceeding, which
though involving the same rights passed upon, is yet predicated
upon facts that have arisen subsequent to the former adjudica-
tion.71 A judgment being conclusive only upon matters within
the issues, is not an estoppel as to after-occurring facts not
involved in the suit in which the judgment was rendered. 2
(B) MONOPOLY AND COMBINATION (CONSPIRACY) ARE LEGALLY
DISTINCT OFrENSES.
A second detour around the res judicata doctrine grows out
of the situations wherein in the first trial the charge is monopoly
and in the second is combination, albeit the identical facts are
relied on in each trial.
In the two eases of United States v. McAn drews & Forb s
Co.,73 the defendants were indicated under Section 172 of the
Sherman Act on three counts, the first charging a combination,
and the second a conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade and
commerce, while the third asserted an attempt to monopolize a
portion of the same. All three counts are based upon the same
allegations of fact, and in effect assert that the same doings,
facts and circumstances constitute at once a combination, con-
spiracy and monopoly. The indictment having come on for
trial resulted in a verdict of guilty against the corporate
defendants upon the first and third counts only, i.e. for com-
bination and monopoly under the Sherman Act. It is urged by
the defendants that the charges of combination and monopoly
constitute but one offense, and that therefore either (1) the
verdict is void and judgment thereon is unlawful, or (2) that
no punishment can be awarded upon more than one count, as
to impose a fine under both counts would amount to a double
punishment for the same offense. Judge Hough said, "The true
test of the correctness of the defendant's position is whether
upon a review of both the facts and the law identity exists
between the offenses proved in this case and called in the first
combination and in the third monopoly. If identity does exist,
a conviction under either count would be a bar to a prosecution
on the other, and therefore a bar to punishment on both. The
rule regarding identity of offenses is to discover whether the
' 24 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 777.
2 Black on Judgments, sec. 617.
149 Fed. 825, 836.
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crimes under consideration are in substance precisely the same,
or of the same nature or species, or that one crime is an
ingredient of the other."
"In this case the crimes of monopoly and combination are
legally distinct. The offense under the first count was complete
when the combination was actually formed with the intent to
bring about restraint of interstate commerce. The additional
overt acts were butt cumulative evidence from which the true
intent, purpose and continuation of the combination might be
inferred. But they were themselves the proof of the monopoly,
and the monopoly consisted in their aggregate effect. That the
prosecution in overwhelmingly proving the existence and intent,
and continuance of the combination proved the monopoly does
not in my opinion render the offenses identical, merely because
all the evidence offered was in a sense applicable to both counts.
How slight the difference may be to deprive the plea of former
jeopardy or autrefois convict of validity the cases clearly show"
(pp. 837-838).
(C) CIVIL SUIT UNDER SI-ERMAN ACT DOES NOT BAR
CRIMINAL ACTION OR VICE VERSA.
A third detour around the doctrines of res judicata is that
a civil suit will not bar a criminal prosecution or vice versa.
The Serman Act provides for both civil and criminal proceed-
ings by the government. Further, the pendency of a criminal
case against the defendants is no reason for postponing the suit
in equity against such defendants concerning the same offense
charged in the indictment. The court will not wait, unless in an
exceptional case, the determination of the criminal case.
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Further, the statute especially authorizes the court to entertain
proceedings in equity at the instance of the government, to
prevent and restrain violations of its provisions. This settles
the question of the jurisdiction of a court of equity to prevent
by injunction the commission of a crime. The fact that the
government does not have a pecuniary interest in the suit is not
sufficient to defeat it. 5
"United States v. Standard Mfg. Co., 191 Fed. 172, af'd 226
U. S. 20.




The rule as to the effect of judgments in criminal cases as
evidence in civil cases is stated by Freeman as follows :76
"The record of a conviction or of an acquittal is not, according
to a decided preponderance of authority, conclusive of the facts on
which it is based in any civil action nor ordinarily is it even evidence
of such facts. The chief reason for excluding the record of a criminal
prosecution from evidence in a civil case is that the parties to the
two proceedings are different. One who has been damaged by
some criminal act of another has a claim for remuneration independ-
ent of the right of the government to proceed against the offender,
and to inflict the penalty prescribed by law. While the difference
in parties and lack of mutuality are a logical and sufficient reason
in most cases for this general rule, other reasons given are the
different rules of evidence and procedure which prevail in civil
and criminal cases and the differing degrees of proof required. But
the only real occasion or necessity for resorting to the latter class of
reasons is in those cases where the parties are the same."
The latter reason would be the appropriate one under the
Sherman Act for the government can bring against the same
parties either a criminal or civil action under the law. The
earlier doctrine that civil remedies were merged in the higher
offense (the erminal one) and could not be pursued until after
the trial and conviction of the offender is now obsolete.77
(D) ANOTHER DETOUR GROWS OUT OF THE DOCTRINE THAT
No QUESTION BECOmES RES JUDICATA UNTIL IT IS
SETTLED By A FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE EIFRITS.
In Berman v. United States,78 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
speaking for a unanimous court said, "In criminal cases, as well
as civil, the judgment is final for the purpose of appeal when it
terminates the litigation * * * on the merits" and "leaves
nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined." St. Louis I.M. & S. R.. v. Southern Express Co.,
108 U.S. 24, 28; United States v. Pile, 130 U.S. 280, 283; Heike
v. United States, 217 U.S. 423, 429. Where two actions involv-
ing the same issue or issues, between the same parties or their
privies, are pending at the same time, so that a final judgment
in one would be res judicata or a bar in the other, when the
judgment becomes final it may be urged in the other by appro-
priate proceedings, regardless of which action was begun first.7 9
It is the first final judgment, although it may be in the second
"'Freeman on Judgments, vol. 2, secs. 653-654.
"Ibid., vol. 2, sec. 559.
' 302 U. S. 211, 212, 213 (1937).
,'Hart Electric Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U. S. 294.
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suit, that renders the matter res judicata in the other suit.80
In Webb v. Buckleysl the court said, "It is only a final judg-
ment upon the merits which prevents further contest upon the
same issue, and becomes evidence in another action between the
same parties or their privies. Until final judgment is reached
the proceedings are subject to change and modification, are
imperfect and inchoate, and can avail nothing as a bar or as
evidence, until the judgment, with its verity as a record, settles
finally and conclusively the question at issue. An interlocutory
order is not such a judgment. It is not a judgment at all."
A well lmown classification of judgments8 2 not on the
merits is stated as follows: (1) where the plaintiff fails for want
of jurisdiction in the court to hear his complaint or to grant
him relief; (2) where he has misconceived his action; (3) where
he has not brought the proper parties before the court; (4)
where the decision was on demurrer, and the complaint in the
second suit sets forth the cause of action in the proper form;
(5) where the first suit was prematurely brought and (6) where
the matter in the first suit is ruled out as inadmissible under the
pleadings.
Two of the common devices used in antitrust litigation are
the plea of nolo contendere and the consent decree. Under the
above rule relating to "finality" and "merits" the courts have
held that a plea of nolo con tendere does not create an estoppel
but is an admission of guilt for the purposes of the case only.8 3
It cannot be used against the defendant as an admission in any
civil suit for the same act.8 4 For the purposes of the case only
it is equivalent to a plea of guilty, but is distinguishable from
such plea in that it cannot be used as an admission in any civil
suit for the same act.8 5 On the contrary, a jugment entered
upon confession without action is as conclusive as any other
final judgment, and it is equally protected against collateral
I McDougal v. Black Panther Oil & Gas Co., 273 Fed. 113.
82 N. Y. 555.
Smith's Leading Cases, Case 673; see also Freeman on Judg-
ments, vol. 2, sec. 732.
8' Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451; see Hadlicek's Criminal
Prosecutions under the Sherman Antitrust Act, Chapter IX; also
Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 Fed. Supp. 366.
"Fidelity-Phenix Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 166 So. 604, 609; 231 Ala.
680.
" Tucker v. United States, 196 Fed. 260, 262, 266, 267.
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attack or impeachment; and like a judgment rendered after a
contest on the merits, it operates as a merger of the cause of
action, and while it remains in force, the plaintiff cannot main-
tain an action for the same claim or demand. 86
(E) THE "SWEEPING T xmMs" OR THE "GENERAL
LANGUAGE" of the FORMiER DECREE Do NoT OF THEm-
SELVES DETERMINE THE GIST OF THE PRIOR ACTION OR
SERVE AS THE SOLE TEST OF WHETHER THERE IS AN
IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION.
As a device for limiting the application of the doctrine of
res judicata, a proper interpretation of the former decree is
important. The courts in antitrust cases, because of the brevity
and vagueness of the statute, are often tempted to issue injunc-
tions in broad and general terms which often amount to a mere
prohibition against violation of the law. This practice was
condemned by Mr. Justice Holmes in Swift v. United States87
in these words: "We equally are bound by the first principles
of justice not to sanction a decree so vague as to put the whole
conduct of the defendant's business at the peril of a summons
for contempt. We cannot issue a general injunction against all
possible breaches of the law." In accordance with this warn-
ing, the court held that the general words of the injunction, "or
by any other method or device, the purpose and effect of which
is to restrain commerce as aforesaid" should be stricken out.
(at p. 401.) But in spite of the warning, the practice continues.
As an additional detour around the res judicata doctrine, a
proper interpretation of the sweeping character of the former
decree will be found useful in many cases. Two leading cases
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States state the
proper canon of construction in interpreting a former decree.
In Vicksburg v. Vicksb urg Water Co.88 the court said, "A decree
must be read in the light of the issites involved in the pleadings
and the relief sought, and we are of the opinion that the matters
now litigated were not involved in or disposed of in the former
case, and that, when properly construed, the decree does not
finally dispose of the right of the city to regulate rates under a
law passed after the contract went into effect, and long after
Black on Judgments, sec. 698.196 U. S. 375, 396.
206 U. S. 496, 508 (1907).
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the bill was filed in the case." Later in Vicksburg v. Hensons9
the court said, "The nature and extent of the former decree is
not to be determined by seizing upon isolated parts of it or pas-
sages in the opinion considering the rights of the parties, but
upon an examination of the issues made and intended to be sub-
mittcd, and what the decree was really designed to accomplish.
We cannot agree with the court below or with the majority of
the circuit court of appeals, that the effect of the former
adjudication was to preclude the rights of the parties in the
present controversy."
-231 U. S. 259, 273 (1913); see also Nereny v. N. Y. N. H. &
H. R. R. Co., 83 F. (2d) 409, 411 (C. C. A. 2,, 1936), and N. Y. N. H.
& H. R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361,
104 (1905).
